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ARTICLE
ORDER ETHICS AND THE PROBLEM
OF SOCIAL GLUE
CHRISTOPH LUETGE*
I. THE PROBLEM SETTING
It is an old question of philosophy—from Plato and Aristotle to Hob-
bes, Hume, Kant, and Hegel—to ask what holds human societies together.
However, during the last century, and especially since the dawn of global-
ization, this question has gained much importance as societies face a previ-
ously unknown degree of cultural, social, and economic pluralism.1 It is not
clear how or even whether age-old answers to this problem can have bear-
ing on modern social problems. To give only one example of how modern
problems differ from past ones, consider how collective structures and so-
cial arrangements in modern societies are far more vulnerable to the actions
of individuals or small groups than in earlier days, which has been known
in theory long before, and has been made dramatically clear by the events
on September 11, 2001.
Many contemporary positions in social and political philosophy (some
of which will be discussed here) have been asking the following question:
Granted that actors in modern societies strive for advantages and benefits,
do we still need some kind of a social glue beyond this mere quest for
advantages and benefits? I would like to call this kind of social glue a moral
surplus.2 A moral surplus is a moral capacity or capability that the citizens
of a modern society have to adopt in order to keep their society stable. This
* Christoph Luetge received his Ph.D. in philosophy in 1999 from the Technical University
of Braunschweig and his habilitation from the University of Munich in 2005. He worked as a
visiting researcher in Pittsburgh, San Diego, and Venice. Since 2010, he holds the Peter Lo¨scher
Chair of Business Ethics at Technical University of Munich. The author thanks Wulf Kaal and the
University of St. Thomas School of Law for the opportunity to present some of these ideas at the
Symposium on Global Business Ethics.
1. Compare, for example, JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
(2002) and JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION (2004), for accounts of the phe-
nomenon of globalization.
2. For more on this term, see generally CHRISTOPH LUETGE, ORDER ETHICS OR MORAL
SURPLUS: WHAT HOLDS A SOCIETY TOGETHER? (2014).
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moral surplus, according to these positions, is necessary in addition to rules
and incentive structures. It may, however, differ in degree and strength.
In this paper, I will discuss some contemporary philosophical posi-
tions, which (except for the last one—K. Binmore) argue that modern soci-
eties do indeed require a moral surplus to prevent human societies from
destabilizing. The positions analyzed in the following sections are J.
Habermas’s discourse ethics, J. Rawls’s political liberalism, D. Gauthier’s
contractarian moral theory, and finally, K. Binmore’s game theory-based
contractarianism. As I can dedicate only a short part of this article to each
of these positions, I will restrict myself to the following question: Can the
moral surplus in question remain stable in the face of opposing incentives?
This question can be explicated in the following, rather simple, way:
The prime situational model for interactions that concern drastically disad-
vantageous incentives to all actors is the prisoners’ dilemma (PD).3 In PD
situations, actors behaving cooperatively are permanently faced with the
possibility of being “exploited” by others, therefore they pre-emptively stop
cooperating. This leads to a situation where rational, self-interested actors
end up with a result that leaves everyone worse off and no one better off.4
Two of the four approaches discussed here (Gauthier and Binmore) regard
the PD as their conceptual starting point.
I will argue that the question whether the moral surplus can remain
stable must be answered negatively in each of the cases discussed, with the
exception of Binmore. None of the first three surpluses can remain stable
against opposing incentives in PD situations. I will start with Habermas’s
discourse ethics.
II. HABERMAS: RATIONAL MOTIVATION
In arguing for the importance of discourses as grounds for normative
theory, Habermas makes a fundamental assumption—the participants of a
discourse must allow their behavior, at least partially, to be motivated by a
rational motivation.5 With the help of this concept, Habermas explicates the
3. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984), for conceptualizations
of the prisoners’ dilemma. Sometimes this situation is also called the prisoner’s dilemma. I delib-
erately use the plural because it is an interaction problem for both actors, not just a unilateral
decision problem for a single actor.
4.  Id. PD situations means introducing sanctions, i.e., incentives. If this is done by way of
institutions, then this is in agreement with my approach (see infra Part VI). If not, then it is
unclear what could be meant by iterating a PD situation “in real life” without relying on institu-
tions for stability.
5. See J ¨URGEN HABERMAS, 2 THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, 26, 29 (Thomas
McCarthy trans., Beacon Press) (1981) [hereinafter HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE AC-
TION] ; J ¨URGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 58, 109
(Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., MIT Press) (1990) [hereinafter
HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS] ; J ¨URGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CON-
TRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW 5 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press) (1992) [herein-
after HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS] .
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difference between his two opposing types of actions: strategic and commu-
nicative. This difference represents a central antagonism in Habermas’s the-
ory. While strategic action (strategisches Handeln) is affected by incentives
and sanctions, communicative action (kommunikatives Handeln) is led by
rational motivation.6 But what, then, is rational motivation and where does
it come from?
It is difficult to find an answer to this question in Habermas’s writings.
In Theory of Communicative Action, he simply postulates: “If arguments are
valid, then insight into the internal conditions of their validity can have a
rationally motivating force.”7 Yet a few pages earlier, there is a footnote in
which Habermas admits that the concept of a rational motivation has not yet
been analyzed satisfactorily.8
In later works, the situation does not get much better. In Diskursethik:
Notizen zu einem Begru¨ndungsprogramm, the necessity of a rational moti-
vation is stressed several times,9 but only in one instance is a justification
given. Here, Habermas relies on the illocutionary effects of a speech act.10
He assumes that speech acts can force actors to perform certain actions and
refrain from others. The core of this assumption is the idea of a performa-
tive contradiction.11 According to Habermas, a rationally motivated actor is
led by the desire to avoid a performative contradiction.
It is doubtful whether a speech act has such a binding force. It seems
that Habermas recognizes this problem himself, as he invents a dialogue
with a fictitious skeptic who doubts exactly this binding force of speech
acts.12 However, Habermas responds that the skeptic may well stick to his
position but then has to “be silent.” He cannot escape the Lebenswelt,
which, according to Habermas, is formed by cultural tradition and socializa-
tion, which in turn work through rational motivation. If he tried to escape,
he would end in “schizophrenia and suicide.”13
In the 1990s, Habermas’s thought developed in new directions. He
faced the problem of the skeptic again in “Remarks on Discourse Ethics.”
Here, Habermas first seems to weaken the power of rational motivation by
attributing to moral norms only “the weak motivating force of good rea-
sons.”14 He goes as far as stating that “the validity of moral commands is
subject to the condition that they are universally adhered to as the basis for
6. See HABERMAS, MORAL CONCIOUSNESS, supra note 5, at 58.
7. HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 29; see also id. at 42.
8. Id. at 26, 411 n.28.
9. See HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS, supra note 5, at 58, 72, 109.
10. Id. at 58.
11. See id. at 80–81 (explicating further the idea of a performative contradiction).
12. See generally HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS, supra note 5.
13. Id. at 102.
14. J ¨URGEN HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON DISCOURSE ETHICS
33 (Ciaran P. Cronin trans., MIT Press) (1993).
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a general practice,”15 thus implying that individuals might be allowed to
behave “immorally” when faced with possible exploitation by others. This
would be the case in prisoners’ dilemma situations.16 However, in the rest
of his article, Habermas does not consider this a problem of ethics. Rather,
he writes, it can only be argued within the discourse of law that some norms
might be valid yet not reasonable (zumutbar) because of their lack of gen-
eral acceptance.
Consequently, this leads Habermas to include institutions in his con-
ception, which were rather neglected in his earlier work. He recognizes that
the problem of compliance to norms cannot be solved by postulates of ra-
tional motivation or by citing developmental psychology.17 In Between
Facts and Norms, he explicitly develops an account of law and institutions.
However, even here it is clear that he does not rely on sanctions and incen-
tives alone as a means for governing modern societies. Rather, the citizens
must still have certain characteristics—they have to accept not only the le-
gal rules, but also normative claims resulting in turn from the idealized
discourse assumptions.18 Habermas still assumes a “coordination of plans
of actions”19 by language—thus still assuming the existence of rational mo-
tivation working via speech acts. Consequently, Habermas’s main claims
are still intact in his second, institutional, phase.
Now the question mentioned above becomes relevant: Can rational
motivation remain stable in view of opposing incentives? One problem with
Habermas’s argument concerning speech acts is his reconstruction of the
Lebenswelt.20 In my view, there are alternative and less harmonious recon-
structions of the Lebenswelt possible, in which the binding force of speech
acts is much weaker. One major example is the game-theoretic approach
that reconstructs all human interactions as “riddled” with dilemma situa-
tions like the prisoners’ dilemma.21 These situations can be either manifest
(as in open market interactions with competition being obvious) or hidden.
Hidden PD situations that have been overcome are exemplified prominently
in all the institutions like police and jurisdiction that come into effect as a
consequence of the social contract which enables the actors to escape from
15. Id. at 34.
16. For more on PD situations, see generally KEN BINMORE, GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT: VOL. 1: PLAYING FAIR (1994) [hereinafter BINMORE, GAME THEORY VOL. 1]; KEN
BINMORE, GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: VOL. 2: JUST PLAYING (1998) [hereinafter
BINMORE, GAME THEORY VOL. 2]; KARL HOMANN, VORTEILE UND ANREIZE: ZUR GRUNDLEGUNG
EINER ETHIK DER ZUKUNFT (Christoph Luetge ed., 2002) (in which each assign the PD a central
role in their ethical or ethically relevant approaches).
17. In some (earlier) works, he makes extensive use of L. Kohlberg’s developmental psy-
chology. See, e.g., HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS, supra note 5.
18. See HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 5, at 17–18, 459–62.
19. Id. at 34.
20. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 5.
21. See generally BINMORE, GAME THEORY VOL. 1, supra note 16; BINMORE, GAME THEORY
VOL. 2, supra note 16.
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the natural state (i.e., a PD situation). Sanctioning institutions are often so-
lutions to prisoners’ dilemma situations.
In a phenomenalistic perspective that does not look beyond the sur-
face, it appears the individuals who act according to these institutions have
been moved by a rational motivation. However, in another perspective, the
“deeper” structures behind become visible, and it becomes clear that it is
not just rational motivation, but rather incentives and possible sanctions (in
this case, informal) that hold this social practice in place. This casts doubt
on Habermas’s claim to have found the only reconstruction of everyday
practices.
Moreover, while Habermas introduces institutions into his conception
in later works, thus allowing for sanctioning by legal rules, he still relies on
his original idea of rationally motivated individuals. Institutions are as-
signed only a secondary place, while the original moral surplus survives
intact. Therefore, Habermas’s conceptions can be regarded as a chief exam-
ple of a moral surplus theory.
III. RAWLS: THE SENSE OF JUSTICE
Rawls’s conception of justice as fairness (JF)22 is known so well, so I
can limit myself to some very general remarks. I will focus here on the
conception as it is presented in Political Liberalism.23 Its main starting
point is the idea that JF is political, not a metaphysical conception. For
Rawls, this is the only conception of justice suitable for modern, pluralistic
societies, where pluralism of values and norms must be regarded as a per-
manent condition.24 The constitution of a modern state cannot be built on
any comprehensive (e.g., philosophical or religious) doctrine, but only on
an idea that avoids conflicts between these doctrines—a political concep-
tion. It can be characterized by the following four points:
(1) The conception must be freestanding. It must be possible to pre-
sent this conception without reference to comprehensive doctrines. It
should, however, be possible to find arguments for this conception from the
point of view of different doctrines.25 Rawls hopes that JF will eventually
be supported by an overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines.26
22. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIB-
ERALISM 3–40 (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM] .
23.  There are some interesting differences between the “Theory of Justice” and “Political
Liberalism,” but I cannot go into detail here.
24. See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
223, 223–51 (1985) (discussing this concept for the first time).
25. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at 10–11.
26. Id. at 58–66.
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(2) The conception will judge only the basic structure of a society,
that is, only the basic institutions—like freedom of speech, property rules,
etc.—which have extraordinary importance for the citizens.27
(3) The main content of this conception are the two famous principles
of justice. First, all people have equal claims “to a fully adequate scheme of
equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same
scheme for all.”28 Second, social and economic inequalities are justified
only insofar as they are “attached to positions and offices open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity” and they must be to the greatest
advantage of the least advantaged.29
(4) The acceptance of these two principles can be reconstructed as a
choice of rational actors in an original position.30 While the construction of
this original position is less relevant here and has been discussed else-
where,31 it is important to note that it is only a means of presentation, a
think tool not to be understood in an ontological sense.32
While the conception of justice described so far is generally known, it
is only part of the story. Just like Habermas, Rawls regards a moral surplus
as indispensable for the stability of modern societies. According to Rawls,
the citizens of a modern state must have two “moral” capabilities. First,
they must have personal conception of the good, and second, be motivated
by a sense of justice.33 While the first is rather unproblematic and will not
be discussed here, the second is quite interesting and poses a number of
problems.
Rawls characterizes the sense of justice34 as an integral part of a well-
ordered society35 and defines it as “the capacity to understand, to apply, and
normally to be moved by an effective desire to act from (and not merely in
accordance with) the principles of justice.”36 The central passage “to act
from” is important—Rawls explicitly does not want to say that individuals
comply with rules because of expected benefits. Rather (in my reading of
27. Id. at 11–12.
28. Here again, I use the wording employed by Rawls. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra
note 22, at 5.
29. Id. at 6.
30. Id. at 22–28.
31. See Ronald Dworkin, The Original Position, in READING RAWLS 16, 16–52 (Norman
Daniels ed., 1975).
32. See generally John Rawls, Reply to Habermas, 92 J. PHIL. 132 (Mar. 1995).
33. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at 35.
34.  The sense of justice concept appears first in “The Sense of Justice.” John Rawls, The
Sense of Justice, 72 PHIL. REV. 281, 281–303 (1963).
35.  A society is well-ordered according to Rawls if (a) the two principles of justice are
generally accepted, (b) the basic structure conforms with these principles, and (c) the citizens
possess a sense of justice. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at 35–39.
36. I use the more elaborated wording employed by Rawls rather than his shorter version.
Compare RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at 302, with RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBER-
ALISM, supra note 22, at 19.
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this passage), the principles of justice must be complied with even if no
personal benefits can be made out.
This becomes clear again in a second, more general definition of the
sense of justice, which is defined here as the capability “to honor fair terms
of cooperation.”37 The phrase “to honor” is important—fair rules can be
honored by all actors regardless of the incentives in effect. Rawls does not
talk about governance by incentives in this context. The rules of a fair soci-
ety are characterized as fair, but he does not say if they are to be sanctioned.
In particular, he does not say how counterproductive consequences—in PD
situations, for example—might be avoided. If my reading of Rawls is cor-
rect, he would have to call for compliance with norms or rules even if there
were PD-like incentives running against it.38
This is one of the main themes in JF, which becomes visible in several
opposing concepts that Rawls constructs: the reasonable versus the rational,
the modus vivendi versus the overlapping consensus, and the constitutional
consensus versus the overlapping consensus.39 In all three cases, Rawls’s
moral surplus, the sense of justice, plays a decisive role. First, the individu-
als who are just rational, but not reasonable, lack the sense of justice. Sec-
ond, an overlapping consensus can only be formed by individuals acting
from the sense of justice. I will focus here on the second point.40
Rawls emphasizes that JF has to be supported by an overlapping con-
sensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines and not just by a “mere” mo-
dus vivendi. He defines the modus vivendi as a contract between two parties
with opposing goals. Both parties are interested in keeping the contract.41
However, they would break it if the situational conditions changed and their
own interest could be better pursued at the others’ expense. According to
Rawls, this situation cannot serve as a basis for social stability. A consensus
founded only “on self- or group interests,” being only the result of “political
bargaining,”42 must be regarded as inherently unstable—if the conditions
changed, so would the modus vivendi, with the result of social stability er-
oding.43 Rawls also assumes that a society collapses if its conception of
justice and its democratic order are not “supported by at least a substantial
majority of its politically active citizens.”44
37. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at 302.
38. Id. at 35 (“[C]itizens have a normally effective sense of justice and so they generally
comply with society’s basic institutions.”) (emphasis added).
39. For the following, compare with LUETGE, supra note 2.
40. The difference between the rational and the reasonable has been widely analyzed. See,
e.g., VICTORIA DAVION & CLARK WOLF, THE IDEA OF A POLITICAL LIBERALISM: ESSAYS ON
RAWLS (2000); CHANDRAN KUKATHAS & PHILIP PETTIT, RAWLS: A THEORY OF JUSTICE AND ITS
CRITICS (1990).
41.  A modus vivendi is thus not comparable to a “cease fire” as opposed to a peace treaty,
but is rather a “simple” (exchange) contract.
42. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at 147.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 38.
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In view of this, Rawls wants to build social stability on a stronger
basis—on an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doc-
trines. This consensus comprises Rawls’s idea that the individuals must be
able to agree on a political conception of justice like JF, not only from self-
interest—and thus not only from an interest in general compliance to the
rules of the contract—but on the basis of their personal comprehensive doc-
trines. While these doctrines certainly differ in many regards, the overlap-
ping consensus is considered possible for two reasons.45 First, the political
values of all members of a society are very important, as they determine the
basic structure of social life. Second, Rawls insists that reasonable compre-
hensive doctrines have always left room for interpretation, as the develop-
ment both of Christian and Islamic thought show. Theologians and
philosophers have continuously been able to demonstrate how religious and
philosophical values are compatible with political values. This is possible,
according to Rawls, because a political conception does not say anything
about the truth of comprehensive doctrines. These doctrines must only ac-
cept the existence of other reasonable comprehensive doctrines.
For the problem at hand, it is relevant that an overlapping consensus
differs from a modus vivendi in the following three respects:
(1) The overlapping consensus does not depend on changing circum-
stances and is therefore more stable.46
(2) The overlapping consensus comprises conceptions of the person
and the society and also principles of justice. It is thus much “deeper” than
a modus vivendi, as it extends into the moral domain. Moral reasons, which
are developed on the basis of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, deter-
mine the acceptance of the conception of justice.47
(3) Rawls defines the overlapping consensus not as a point of conver-
gence, where conflicting interests converge and where people agree “on
accepting certain authorities, or on complying with certain institutional ar-
rangements.”48 Mere adherence to the rules is thus not enough for the citi-
zens. Rather, what Rawls demands is adherence for the right reasons.
According to him, this demand for the use of reason is a functional one, as
it is in the interest of social stability.49 If, as I will argue, stability could be
achieved without an overlapping consensus, then Rawls’s argument would
be undermined.
For Rawls, the modus vivendi will thus not yield sufficient stability.
We might be inclined to take this for granted, as the modus vivendi seems
indeed rather weak. However, Rawls goes on to argue against an intermedi-
ate concept that lies between the modus vivendi and the overlapping consen-
45. See id. at 133–72.
46. See id. at 148.
47. Id.
48. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at 147.
49. Id.
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sus—the constitutional consensus. The latter might evolve from the modus
vivendi and implies agreement on at least part of the values of political
liberalism, in particular about the political procedures and some basic rights
and liberties.50 As a result, the constitutional consensus should give a soci-
ety at least a little more stability than the modus vivendi, even if the sense of
justice is not yet in effect.
But Rawls regards the constitutional consensus as still too narrow. It
should only be a first basis for a discussion between different political
groups with political doctrines of their own.51 In order to dispute peacefully
in public, the groups have to develop political conceptions of justice. They
have to learn how to argue and how to convince other groups. This would
lead to a more differentiated discussion of questions of justice, in the course
of which an overlapping consensus might arise, by agreeing, among other
things, on basic rights and liberties.52
Rawls concedes, however, that the “different social and economic in-
terests” might impede this development.53 Under the following two condi-
tions, the conflicts might turn out to be insurmountable: if the different
conceptions of justice are “supported by and encourage deeply conflicting
political and economic interests,”54 and if the conflicts of interests cannot
be overcome by a constitution, then “a full overlapping consensus cannot, it
seems, be achieved.”55 This seems to imply that such conflicts can only be
balanced by constitutional rules, not by any moral surpluses. But if that is
the case, where is the higher dignity of the overlapping consensus vis-a`-vis
the constitutional consensus and the modus vivendi, which likewise require
both the balancing of interests? Is the overlapping consensus nothing but a
long-entrenched constitutional consensus?
It is clear that Rawls has more than that in mind. Overcoming conflicts
of interests is apparently a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for an
overlapping consensus. The overlapping consensus offers more stability
than the two lower levels, but it can only come into effect if the citizens
develop a moral surplus, that is, the sense of justice.56 However, there re-
mains a problem when trying to separate the different forms of consensus.
Rawls goes on to argue that an overlapping consensus is necessary in a
functional way to avoid conflicts.57 But remember that certain types of con-
50. See id. at 158–59.
51. Id. at 164–68.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 167.
54. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at 168.
55. Id.
56. For a critical account of this, see Claudia Mills, Not a Mere Modus Vivendi: The Bases
for Allegiance to the Just State, in THE IDEA OF A POLITICAL LIBERALISM: ESSAYS ON RAWLS
193–203 (Victoria Davion & Clark Wolf eds., 2000).
57. He writes that a “constitutional consensus will prove too narrow,” as a democratic people
will have to be “sufficiently unified and cohesive” in order to cover, among others, basic matters
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flicts can impede the overlapping consensus. So is this a vicious circle?
Could it be that the very conflicts that are to be avoided by an overlapping
consensus might impede it? To put it differently, could it be that the over-
lapping consensus does not actually solve these conflicts but only seems to
solve them?
Rawls does not make clear how strong a conflict must be in order to
impede an overlapping consensus. Does it have to be a very deep constitu-
tional conflict, like that of abolishing slavery in the United States, or would
smaller conflicts (e.g., over the construction of new highways) suffice?
Rawls would probably respond that this is not a question for philosophical
theory, but only for practical application. Nevertheless, in order to make
claims about the stability of different levels of consensus, I think a theory of
conflicts would be a desideratum. This theory would have to explain which
types of conflicts an overlapping consensus could avoid and which types
might impede it.
In sum, Rawls regards the sense of justice as an indispensable element
in the development of an overlapping consensus that, in turn, could generate
sufficient social stability. There is, however, a certain tension in his argu-
ment—between the claim that the sense of justice must not be based on
interests, on the one hand, and the claim that the overlapping consensus
fulfils a social function in avoiding conflicts (which should be in the inter-
ests of all), on the other hand.
IV. GAUTHIER: DISPOSITIONS
In his 1986 book Morals by Agreement, D. Gauthier tried to develop
an account of morals as based purely on self-interest, thus starting with
assumptions fundamentally different from those of the previous two ap-
proaches. Gauthier starts by stating that moral problems arise due to PD
situations.58 In a PD situation, the participants recognize that the result of
their (rational) actions is quite unwanted by all parties. The solution pro-
posed by Gauthier is that all actors should commit themselves to a certain
principle of justice—the principle of “minimax relative concession”
(MRC).59 In MRC, each individual accepts a rule that minimizes her high-
est possible relative concessions to others.60 Gauthier argues that MRC is to
be adopted in a two-step procedure. First, the actors choose MRC from self-
interest. Afterwards, however, MRC is to constrain the actors’ self-
interest.61
of justice. Otherwise, “conflict will arise about these.” RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note
22, at 166.
58. See DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 12 (1986).
59. Id. at 157.
60. See David Gauthier, Political Contractariansim, 5 J. POL. PHIL. 132, 135 (1997).
61. For the following, see LUETGE, supra note 2.
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Gauthier tries to show that MRC would be chosen by rational, utility-
maximizing actors for the sake of greater benefits in the long run. However,
he recognizes that this is not enough and that the problem of compliance to
MRC is not solved easily by pointing to its rationality. Gauthier reminds us
of “Hobbes’s Foole.” In the Leviathan,62 the Foole is introduced to show
that an actor’s acceptance of a contract is not a sufficient condition to be
motivated to comply with the contract. The Foole sees the remaining PD
and argues that it would be best for him if all others complied, but he him-
self could break the contract.
Now, it is important to note that Gauthier does not want to enforce
compliance by sanctions and incentives. This would be “a political, not a
moral, solution,”63 which would neglect a central difference between
morals and interests—“Were duty no more than interest, morals would be
superfluous.”64 Morals would be more efficient in solving interaction
problems because, according to Gauthier, the cost of supervision and en-
forcement of norms would be reduced to zero.65 A voluntary keeping of
moral agreements would make at least some institutions unnecessary.
Gauthier is thus not against political solutions per se, but he hopes to substi-
tute them by “cheaper” means.
Gauthier’s alternative proposal is that all actors should internalize
MRC by adopting a disposition to constrain their actions. He distinguishes
between two types of actors: straightforward maximizers (SMs) and con-
strained maximizers (CMs).66 While both types maximize their utility, CMs
do so under condition of other actors’ utility. CMs adopt a disposition to
cooperate, which Gauthier also calls the “idea of mutual benefit.”67 A CM
complies with mutually agreed norms if she thinks that her expected utility
would be positive in the case of general compliance, thereby tolerating at
least some degree of free-riding. She will not punish defection by defecting
herself. An SM, by contrast, will always try to directly maximize his utility
without being inhibited by any internalized constraints.
Gauthier shows that in some evolutionary settings, CMs have an ad-
vantage over SMs. If CMs can expect to frequently meet other CMs, they
can stabilize cooperation within their group and thereby realize large gains
from group-internal cooperation. If this leaves the CMs better off than the
SMs, the disposition to cooperate could well spread fast within a society.68
Gauthier admits, however, that if all other actors within a society are SMs,
then the remaining CMs must also behave like SMs.69 In this situation,
62. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 74–75 (Ernest Rhys ed., J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1914).
63. GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT, supra note 58, at 163.
64. Id. at 1.
65. Id. at 164–66.
66. Id. at 15–16.
67. Id. at 157.
68. See id. at 233–67.
69. GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT, supra note 58, at 181.
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morality would have no chance. Moreover, Gauthier states explicitly that a
CM is not just a very sophisticated SM that cooperates because she expects
greater benefits in the long run.70 Rather, she cooperates even if she does
not expect positive retribution.71 She cooperates because her disposition
makes her a moral actor. Here, it becomes clear that, contrary to his original
intention, Gauthier disconnects morals from advantages and benefits.
CMs and SMs are conceptualized as having different natures. Specifi-
cally, CMs are fundamentally different from the homo oeconomicus, which
implies a “radically contractarian view of human relationships.”72 This,
according to Gauthier, would commit us to treating other people only as
means for (even if mutual) benefits. The homo oeconomicus would only
have “asocial motivations”73 in that he would not be motivated by the in-
trinsic value of human relations. This makes him not only asocial, but also
irrational, because Gauthier thinks it rational to comply with intrinsic
values.
A question that remains is how the internalization of dispositions
might take place in practice, with the explicit purpose of maintaining a sta-
ble society.74 The problem of social stability is not, as I have already men-
tioned, to be solved by institutions and sanctions, because these are
regarded as “unproductive transfer[s].”75 In the long run, at least, the indi-
viduals would not accept that resources be wasted on unproductive trans-
fers, which could be used in more efficient ways if all complied with MRC.
Eventually, Gauthier thinks, all actors must understand that it would be best
to stick to MRC.76
However, PD situations remain a problem. Even for Gauthier, the cen-
tral element “in a contractarian theory is not the introduction of the idea of
morality, but the step from hypothetical agreement to actual moral con-
straint.”77 What can help actors out of PD situations that persist even after
people internalize the necessary dispositions? How can dispositions be an
actual moral constraint if some individuals pretend to be CMs but do not
actually cooperate with others? If some such covert SMs must be reckoned
with, it is quite doubtful whether the CMs can uphold their dispositions.
While Gauthier admits that a CM must act like an SM in a population con-
sisting entirely of SMs, he seems to be confident that a sufficiently large
number of CMs is enough to make cooperation among them fruitful.78 But
how many are necessary? While Gauthier cannot be expected to give a fig-
70. Id. at 169–70.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 319 (italics in original).
73. Id.
74. See id. at 179.
75. GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT, supra note 58, at 197.
76. See id. at 190–232.
77. Id. at 9.
78. See id. at 182–84.
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ure, he does not even mention the relevant central idea of the PD, whereby
one (even one potential) defector is enough to destabilize a social arrange-
ment or a moral norm. So if Gauthier took PD situations seriously, he
would be forced to abandon this theory and thereby his moral surplus.
However, in the last chapter of Morals by Agreement, Gauthier seems
to introduce an additional concept: education. This is a rather casual re-
mark, but I think of great importance to his approach:79 “[A]n essentially
just society must be strengthened through the development of the affections
and interests of the young.”80 This seems to be the moral, not political,
solution that Gauthier has in mind. But it seems to me that it is not an
alternative to sanctioning norms. After all, education cannot go without
sanctions. Or does Gauthier rely on some concept of anti-authoritarian edu-
cation? In that case, the PD would remain—how can norms (or disposi-
tions) be enforced if there is no sanctioning mechanism to bring SMs to
cooperate?
It becomes clear that Gauthier recognizes the problem of implementa-
tion but ultimately underestimates it.81 The introduction of dispositions as a
moral surplus can only be a makeshift, not a systematic, solution.82
V. BINMORE: EMPATHETIC PREFERENCES
In his seminal “Game Theory and the Social Contract,” Ken Binmore
has proposed a contractarian approach he calls “naturalistic,” as it relies
heavily both on game-theoretic and on sociobiological concepts. A central
demand of Binmore’s naturalism throughout his books is “No commit-
ments!” I will discuss this first and then elaborate on Binmore’s concept of
“empathetic preferences,” which are supposed to be necessary for social
stability in modern societies. However, as I will try to show, these em-
pathetic preferences are fundamentally different from the moral surpluses
discussed so far.
Binmore emphasizes that a naturalistic approach must abandon all au-
thorities legitimated by metaphysics. According to him, the vast majority of
contemporary approaches in political philosophy—among them, Rawls,
Harsanyi, Gauthier, and Nozick—give metaphysical justifications for rules
79. See also Gauthier, Political Contractarianism, supra note 60, at 148 (stressing the impor-
tance of education).
80. GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT, supra note 58, at 351.
81. To some extent, this has been recognized by Buchanan and Harman, who doubt whether
rational actors would accept a distribution as a result of a hypothetical contract. See JAMES M.
BUCHANAN, The Gauthier Enterprise, in THE ECONOMICS AND THE ETHICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDER 195, 195 (1991); Gilbert Harman, Rationality in Agreement, 5 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 1, 1
(1988). However, in my view, it is not the hypothetical character of the contract that poses a major
problem, but rather the kind of social structures in effect (PD situations).
82. According to Binmore, Gauthier invents a non-existent enforcement mechanism.
BINMORE, GAME THEORY VOL. 1, supra note 16, at 26–27.
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and institutions.83 The common idea of these approaches is that actors can
make commitments. Binmore defines a commitment as an “action in the
present that binds the person who makes it irrevocably in the future.”84 A
commitment is thus a “binding unilateral promise,”85 (i.e., a promise that
ultimately cannot be revoked and therefore—this is my interpretation—is
not and does not have to be enforced by sanctions but can obviously be
secured in some alternative way). A commitment is not equivalent to a rule,
which an actor observes because she expects it to be beneficial to her (at
least in the long run).
The major problem with assuming the possibility of commitments is
the construction of a plausible mechanism of enforcement.86 It is difficult to
commit oneself and convince others that one has committed oneself. One
possible solution is to provide (financial) “hostages.” For example, a com-
pany that has made a commitment to environmental protection may sign a
contract in which they commit themselves to paying a fixed amount of
money if the commitment is broken. And there are other more subtle mech-
anisms of securing commitments via reputation mechanisms. These are
commitments that are enforced via sanctions, however, and not the kind of
commitments that political philosophers like those mentioned above have in
mind.
Binmore proposes a different concept: empathetic preferences.87 The
intuitive idea behind this is that even a homo oeconomicus actor can adapt
his actions better to that of other actors if he can predict their behavior.
Moreover, Binmore distinguishes sharply between a sympathetic and an
empathetic preference as follows: Actor A reveals a sympathetic preference
if it can be deduced from his behavior that he puts himself into actor B’s
position and adopts B’s preferences.88 By contrast, actor A reveals an em-
pathetic preference if it can be deduced from his behavior that he puts him-
self into actor B’s position without taking on B’s preferences. In this case,
A sticks to his own preferences. He can still compare his preferences to B’s
and evaluate or criticize the latter. To cite Binmore’s comparative prefer-
ences example, “I would rather be Eve eating an apple than Adam wearing
a fig leaf.”89
83. Id. at 161.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 162.
87. This goes back to Harsanyi’s “extended preferences.” See JOHN C. HARSANYI, RATIONAL
BEHAVIOR AND BARGAINING EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS 65 (1977). By em-
ploying the concept of ‘empathetic preferences’, Binmore wants to highlight the difference be-
tween the classic concept of sympathy in D. Hume’s works and his modern one. See BINMORE,
GAME THEORY VOL. 1, supra note 16, at 28, 58–60, 285–96; BINMORE, GAME THEORY VOL. 2,
supra note 16, at 212.
88. See BINMORE, GAME THEORY VOL. 1, supra note 16, at 286.
89. Id. at 290.
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Binmore argues that the ability to empathize,90 not the ability to sym-
pathize,91 with others is what makes a human being. He speculates about
the evolutionary history of this ability, which may have been advantageous
for coordinating behavior in hunter-gatherer societies.92 And he distin-
guishes between three time horizons in which empathetic preferences play a
role: short, medium, and long run.93
In the short run, the actor’s personal preferences, as well as her em-
pathetic preferences, are fixed.94 That is, the actor empathizes in exactly the
way her empathetic preferences prescribe and deliberates “morally” in this
way. Here, moral norms are conventions that work as short cuts for long
economic calculations. While morals do not play a role on the level of the
social contract framework, they do influence the individuals’ actions within
this framework. Morals are functional in the short run.95
In the long run, all preferences, personal and empathetic, are subject to
change, as the actor adapts to new situations and new rules.96 Here, new
social contracts are negotiated and existing ones modified. The personal and
empathetic preferences adapt to these new situations. It is interesting to see
that in the long run, all moral content erodes out of the preferences. Over
longer periods of time, the actors arrive—via “moral” empathy—at the
same result as if they had been bargaining straightaway all the time.
Binmore makes it clear that in the long run, morals serve long-run interests,
and more importantly, no moral norms can remain stable that are systemati-
cally opposed to incentives.97
Finally, in the medium run, the personal preferences remain fixed
while the empathetic ones may change.98 According to Binmore, evolution
will bring the latter into “empathy equilibrium,”99 in which all actors have
equal empathetic preferences. It is already in this situation, as in the long
run, that all moral content erodes from the social contract framework. The
90. I prefer to use the term ‘ability to empathize,’ as it is a more general concept than the
empathetic preferences. The latter are preferences that a particular actor reveals in a concrete case
with regard to one or several other actors. These may change from one actor to another and from
case to case.
91. But according to Elster, ‘love and duty,’ i.e., sympathy in Binmore’s terms, are the “ce-
ment of society.” JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY 287 (1989). Binmore responds that mod-
ern societies do not need cement, rather they are like a dry-stone wall in which each stone is kept
in place only by the other stones, i.e., by reciprocity. BINMORE, GAME THEORY VOL. 1, supra note
16, at 24. To maintain reciprocity, however, greed and fear suffice.
92. See BINMORE, GAME THEORY VOL. 1, supra note 16, at 57, 288–90.
93. Id. at 86.
94. Id.
95. See BINMORE, GAME THEORY VOL. 2, supra note 16, at 449–50.
96. See BINMORE, GAME THEORY VOL. 1, supra note 16, at 90.
97. See id. at 89–90.
98. Id. at 87–88.
99. Id. at 65; see also id. at 61–67, 86–90, 290–92.
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actors end up with a result identical to a Nash bargaining equilibrium.100
However, this is at variance with the actors’ own impression. Due to the
semantics employed, they still think that they are guided by moral delibera-
tion in the traditional sense. Binmore consequently regards the ability to
empathize as—at least partially—genetically “hard-wired.”101
The difference between the long and medium run is that in the medium
run, evolution has not had enough time to shape personal preferences and
adapt them to new environments and situations. By distinguishing between
the three time horizons, Binmore defines the role of empathetic preferences
in society—they are used for coordination or, more precisely, for reforming
existing social contracts and consenting to new ones. They are used as a
heuristic tool for finding directions in which new social contracts may de-
velop. In this sense, Binmore regards the empathetic preferences as an im-
portant part of morality.102
The question now is whether empathetic preferences can be regarded
as a moral surplus in the sense of Habermas’s rational motivation or
Rawls’s sense of justice. I think not, for the following reasons. Upon closer
inspection, it becomes clear that empathetic preferences have fewer conse-
quences for their bearers than the other moral surpluses discussed here. In
Rawls’s and Habermas’s works, one gets the impression that both authors
already have in mind a rather precise idea how the citizens should act—or
at least which rules they should adopt. In addition, both works show clear
traces—albeit to different degrees—of an opposition to economic ap-
proaches or, more generally, to those that rely on self-interest for their
implementation.103
This impression does not arise when reading Binmore. First, the em-
pathetic preferences exhibit a peculiar quality—assuming their existence
does not preclude anything for the detailed design of rules and institu-
tions.104 If A can put herself in B’s position, she will in some way try to
assess B. On the one hand, if A regards B as rather unreliable or as only
interested in short-run gains, she will anticipate B’s defection, adapt her
100. See id. at 88. For the Nash equilibrium, see John F. Nash, Jr., Equilibrium Points in n-
Person Games, 36 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 48, 49 (1950), and John F. Nash, Jr., The Bargain-
ing Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950).
101. BINMORE, GAME THEORY VOL. I, supra note 16, at 133; BINMORE, GAME THEORY VOL.
2, supra note 16, at 182. He does not rely entirely on genetic concepts, however, but uses the
concept of the “meme.” RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 189 (30th Anniversary ed. 2006);
see BINMORE, GAME THEORY VOL. 1, supra note 16, at 65–66.
102. BINMORE, GAME THEORY VOL. 1, supra note 16, at 241.
103.  Compare Rawls’s strict separation between the modus vivendi, the constitutional consen-
sus, and the overlapping consensus (see supra Part III).
104.  However, this can also be seen as a shortcoming of Binmore’s work—he does rely
exclusively on evolutionary game theory, as Dore also emphasizes. Mohammed Dore, On Playing
Fair: Professor Binmore on Game Theory and the Social Contract, 43 THEORY & DECISION 219,
236 (1997). While this is certainly relevant to modern societies, we cannot however go without
other branches of economics and other social sciences for the detailed design of institutions.
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own behavior, and tend to “counter-defect pre-emptively” herself.105 If, on
the other hand, A regards B as reliable and if there are no contrary incen-
tives for A to defect, A will tend to cooperate. But this is an open-ended
process, the result of which cannot be precluded by the philosopher.
Second, and more important in my mind, the ability to emphasize can-
not, unlike the moral surpluses reconstructed here, be exploited by other
actors. Consider this: If A constrains her behavior in a PD situation (e.g., by
subscribing to a rational motivation or a sense of justice), she risks being
exploited by B. This can only be avoided if B constrains his behavior in the
same way as A (i.e., by way of sanctions or the like). But if A can just
empathize with B in a PD situation (i.e., rely on empathetic preferences),
she does not necessarily risk exploitation, especially not in a situation
where B acts in ways different from A. For example, suppose that one of
the two prisoners in the classic PD situation (X) is motivated by a sense of
justice. If the other (Y) knows this but is not motivated in this way himself,
he can exploit X without any problem by confessing (i.e., defecting). But if
X “only” has empathetic preferences, this does not necessarily lead to ex-
ploitation. It would only mean that X might anticipate the reaction of Y to
his own “moral” behavior. X could, for example, use this knowledge to try
to turn the tables and exploit Y. In any case, Y cannot gain any unilateral
advantage from knowing that X has adopted empathetic preferences, as Y
would have to count on the fact that X would anticipate this—by empathiz-
ing with Y.
Therefore, I suggest not putting the ability to empathize in the same
basket as the moral surpluses discussed above. It does not preclude any
particular action, and it cannot be exploited.
VI. ORDER ETHICS AS AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW: STABILITY FROM
ADVANTAGES AND INCENTIVES
The idea behind the approach that I would like to sketch here is to
develop an account of norms as functional for social stability while weaken-
ing the assumptions on the actors’ part (i.e., minimizing the necessary
moral surplus). This alternative view is a conception of ethics that proceeds
systematically not from the problem of justification but from the problem of
implementation.106
105. See KARL HOMANN, VORTEILE UND ANREIZE: ZUR GRUNDLEGUNG EINER ETHIK DER
ZUKUNFT 98 (Christoph Luetge ed., 2002); KARL HOMANN & CHRISTOPH LUETGE, EINF ¨UHRUNG IN
DIE WIRTSCHAFTSETHIK 35 (3d ed. 2013).
106. For the order ethics approach, see LUETGE, supra note 2; ORDER ETHICS: AN ETHICAL
FRAMEWORK FOR THE SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY (Christoph Luetge & Nikil Mukerji eds., forth-
coming); HOMANN, supra note 105; HOMANN & LUETGE, supra note 105; Christoph Luetge, Eco-
nomic Ethics, Business Ethics and the Idea of Mutual Advantages, 14 BUS. ETHICS: EUROPEAN
REV. 108, 110–11 (2005). The corresponding idea in Binmore’s approach is the requirement to
first regard only the relevant equilibria and then pick one of them as the desirable.
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Some philosophers, both in the analytic as well as in the continental
tradition, believe that the justification of norms has always been the key
problem of ethics. However, an informed view of economic and social his-
tory107 tells us that the questions of norm implementation and justification
have generally been posed together, but this was not made explicit in for-
mer centuries. The implementation of norms that had already been justified
was not regarded as particularly difficult for two reasons. First, the modern
pluralism of values and life styles had not yet developed, and second, social
relations were not yet as anonymous as in modern times. In particular, com-
monly accepted norms could be enforced much more easily through face-
to-face sanctions.108
Since the beginning of modern times, however, this situation has
changed dramatically. As N. Luhmannhas described, modern societies con-
sist of functionally differentiated sub-systems.109 The actors in modern so-
cieties must act in social sub-systems under completely different
governance mechanisms. With regard to ethics, this often leads to laments
about loss of values. The question how norms can be enforced therefore
becomes much more pressing under modern conditions and must be put at
the beginning of a conception of ethics for modern societies. I would like to
call such a conception an order ethics, or in a different regard, an ethics of
advantages and incentives. We must count on the fact that all actors look
for their advantage (whereby the term “advantage,” of course, covers not
only material advantages), and we have to set the right incentives in order
to deal with this quest for advantages.
Order ethics can be set in a contractarian framework and derived from
a thought experiment. For this argument I refer to B. Ackerman, who has
renewed the classic social contract argument with the aid of a science-fic-
tion thought experiment:110 A group of spacemen lands on a newly discov-
ered planet and tries to build a society there. The spacemen have to
deliberate about the rules of this society in much the same way as the ra-
tional actors in the social contract setting of an original position. Ackerman,
however, explicitly uses the science-fiction scenario in a very peculiar way,
namely to get rid of the question how rules that have been agreed on can be
effectively enforced.111 He assumes that in his fictitious scenario, violations
of rules can be sanctioned automatically by means of a superior technology
(laser cannons).
107. For such a view on Ancient Greece, see generally CHRISTIAN MEIER, ATHENS: A POR-
TRAIT OF THE CITY IN ITS GOLDEN AGE (Robert Kimber & Rita Kimber trans., Metropolitan Books
1998) (giving a historical overview of ancient Athens).
108. See LUETGE, supra note 2.
109. See, e.g., NIKLAS LUHMANN, DIE GESELLSCHAFT DER GESELLSCHAFT (1997).
110. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
111. Id. at 34.
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I do not think this approach leads us very far. Therefore, I have
changed Ackerman’s setting, because the perfect enforcement of rules via
technology simply is not available, even in a futuristic world. If one drops
the assumption that there are laser cannons guaranteeing compliance, Ack-
erman’s thought experiment can be sensibly taken further. Also, I add the
idea that the people aboard the ship already have very different values and
backgrounds. The result is a situation in which rules have to be designed for
a new situation in a society with great pluralism.
From this revised thought experiment, the main thesis of an order eth-
ics can be developed in four steps. First, the problem must be clear for
which an order ethics might be a solution. This problem is the problem of
social order.112 Second, the problem cannot be solved by way of an individ-
ual ethics. An individual ethics (ideally) assumes that morally problematic
states are caused by actors’ immoral motives or preferences. Consequently,
this position calls for a change of motives, or a change of consciousness.
The main mechanism of governance is (moral) appeals, and may be sup-
ported by education.
However, in those structures typical of modern societies (i.e., PD situ-
ations),113 an ethics remains fruitless that addresses primarily the individ-
ual. So in a third step, an order ethics assumes that morally problematic
states are not caused by immoral preferences or motives but by specific
structures of interaction. Therefore, moral claims should aim at revising the
conditions that apply to all actors (i.e., the rules of the game). The main
governance mechanism is the design of incentive structures. Moral norms
cannot be brought into opposition to the logic of advantages and incentives.
Fourth and finally, some refinements have to be made to the social
contract framework. I limit myself to the following two: Contrary to what
some critics of this approach believe, rational actors can invest in the future.
They can invest in better rules, but they can also invest in moral behavior.
There is still room for moral behavior in a social-contract-based order ethics
approach, but this behavior can be explained with the help of the concept of
incomplete or open contracts. As many contracts in modern societies are
systematically incomplete,114 the actors must fill in the gaps in contracts
with their own “moral” behavior—in their own interest.
The arguments in the preceding sections make it clear that it is not
systematically fruitful to base normativity on anthropological capabilities or
characteristics—the moral surpluses. But if these moral surpluses are not
112. See generally FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY VOLUME 1: RULES
AND ORDER 35–54 (1973).
113. As in Gauthier and Binmore, PD situations occupy a pivotal place in this approach.
114. See Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts, in THE NEW PALSGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECO-
NOMICS (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, & Peter Newman eds., 1987); Oliver Hart & Bengt Holm-
stro¨m, The Theory of Contracts, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY – FIFTH WORLD CONGRESS
71 (Truman F. Bewley ed., 1987); Luetge, supra note 106, at 113.
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sustainable, what are the alternatives? The alternative social governance
mechanism that an order ethics would argue for is not based on anthropo-
logical findings, characteristics or surpluses, but on situations. A modern
society that wants to profit from deep specialization and competition has to
switch to a system of governance by rules. With the use of pre-modern
governance mechanisms, the benefits of modern societies cannot be
appropriated.
Which rules and which governance mechanisms are necessary for an
interaction depends only on the situational conditions. For example, there
might be situations in which informal governance by moral norms still
works, and the partners can count on at least approximately equal normative
backgrounds. In such situations, governance by moral norms may still be an
option. However, these cases are not very frequent in modern societies
under conditions of globalization. The number of interactions between indi-
viduals with vastly different cultural, social, and normative backgrounds is
continually and rapidly growing. These individuals cannot rely on common
moral surpluses; they can only rely on common mutually accepted rules—
or they might devise new rules adapted to their situation.
The question is whether even for these cases of rule governance
some—maybe weak and not anthropological, but rather situational—capa-
bility is necessary. Of the concepts discussed here, only the ability to em-
pathize would be a candidate. Notwithstanding this, I argue that if we
abandon any moral surpluses, there are three minimal—and very general—
assumptions that must be given to guarantee functional governance by rules
and social stability: sociality, ability to communicate, and ability to invest.
The first two are rather trivial. That is, there must be some social group
and some mode of communication in effect within this group. But the third
is more interesting and important. Individuals that always maximize utility
in the short run cannot form a stable society. This is nothing spectacular
and is not peculiar to social stability or morals. Every company must be
able to invest in the future. In fact, any form of action and cooperation
requires thinking and planning, which in turn requires investing (i.e., saving
some resources now for greater benefits in the longer run).
Together, these three assumptions might be taken as a minimal basis
for modern globalized societies that cannot rely on moral surpluses. The
actors must only be able to communicate and invest. An order ethics can
then go on to only require these actors to one, comply with the rules, and
two, engage from their own interest in the further development of these
rules in mutually beneficial ways. Such further development can only come
into effect if the individuals affected agree to it. In light of PD situations, it
is systematically not enforceable against the wishes of these individuals.
However, there is a role for what I would like to call heuristics. These
heuristics are values and ideas from philosophical, religious, scientific, lit-
erary, artistic, or other traditions. They can point the actors in new direc-
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tions where new gains of cooperation may be found. But they are conceived
here in a very different way than the moral surpluses. Most importantly,
they are not conceptualized against the logic of advantages and incentives.
They do not erode in PD situations. By contrast, the moral surpluses that
Habermas, Rawls, and Gauthier argue for are all conceptualized in opposi-
tion to interests, advantages, or incentives.
To sum up, an order ethics starts in much the same way as Gauthier
and Binmore suggest. All three approaches regard moral norms in a func-
tional way—as a possible means for governing societies. All three stress the
importance of interactions, and all three see no fundamental contradiction
between morals and self-interest. However, the order ethics approach aims
at solving the problem of implementation primarily by means of rules or
institutions, not (unlike Gauthier) by dispositions, and not (unlike Binmore)
solely by the ability to empathize. Maybe Binmore would agree with my
approach, as he is not at all opposed to employing institutions for imple-
menting norms. However, they are not what he focuses on. I would there-
fore think that order ethics and Binmore’s evolutionary approach are two
complementary conceptions.
The theoretical advantage of both the ability to empathize and the abil-
ity to invest lies in the fact that they do not require the individuals to act
against the logic of advantages and incentives, especially in PD situations.
A practical application might be that a “morally driven” semantics used in
the political sphere, which constructs sharp contradictions between values
and interests, between rational motivation and incentives, between acting
from principles of justice and acting “merely” in accordance with them,
leads us to dead ends and theoretical blockades. If, however, a revised se-
mantics employs concepts like “investing,” “mutual self-interest,” “mutual
gains,” or “win-win-situations,” then even the moral surpluses might be
made productive. They might be seen as part of a heuristics which asks for,
suggests and pleads for, investing in the individuals’ own self-interest.
Eventually, this could turn out to be the heuristics of not only occidental but
also many other traditions of ethics. To show this in detail, however, is a
task for the future.
